One under-addressed issue in the eld of Web Services composition is authentication between disparate services using different authentication methods or protocols. A Single Sign-On (SSO) framework reduces the burden on the end user to provide authentication credentials to these separate services; thus it is a desirable feature for systems and applications that are based on multiple Web Services. However, true SSO is not feasible in a Web Services context, as individual services can be provided by any parties; they may have arbitrary authentication methods, credential types, or protocols, and may not have an existing trust or federation arrangement with a given external authentication system. Due to these factors, it is valuable to provide a specialized service that can provide authentication information seamlessly to the services selected for a given service-enabled process. This paper introduces a uni ed authentication framework for accessing heterogeneous Web Services. We propose a credential storage and retrieval mechanism to store authentication data and pass that data to corresponding Web Services clients. Hence, this framework enables authenticated access to Web Services implemented with arbitrary access control methods.
Introduction
We are evolving into the service computing paradigm.
Many software applications and processes are now built on Web Service-enabled components. By using open standards, protocols, and interfaces, any organization or individual can become a Web Service provider. The heterogeneous and independent nature of Web Services prompts to many challenges for service composition. Beyond the problems in match-making, there are also challenges in bridging incompatible data models and access control methods, etc.
Despite the challenges, with the growing accessibility of the Internet and the sophistication of the middleware tools, many people are working with remote collaborators under the notion of Virtual Organizations (VOs) [21] . A VO usually consists of a group of geographically distributed members and resources. Using the state-of-the-art cyberinfrastructure services, members in a VO can work coherently as a whole to conduct scienti c research, industrial design, or solve business problems. Typically each VO shares a pool of service-enabled resources and communicationenabled tools that may include software applications, hardware, data collections, computational power, storage, and even specialized applications for con guring optical private networks [17, 22] . Naturally, in this type of environment, there will be complex requirements for access control and authorization between the separate entities, with the possible inclusion of multiple unchangeable legacy systems. We developed a Service-oriented Architecture for Virtual Organization Infrastructure and Resources (SAVOIR 1 ) [5, 6, 7] , to facilitate the coordination of resources in collaborative sessions.
In SAVOIR, the pool of shared resources are made available by participants in a VO in the form of Web Services.
As shown in Figure 1 , the SAVOIR dashboard acts as an integrated service client for accessing resources in a VO. The set of resources that appear on the dashboard is customiz- Figure 1 shows how the credential service interacts with other components in SAVOIR. The rest of this paper describes the requirements, design and implementation of such a framework, followed by a discussion and a review of some related works.
Requirements and Desired Features
As it is undesirable to have the end user submit multiple credential sets for a single action, some form of Single SignOn (SSO) architecture is a useful feature for applications that require access to heterogenous Web Services. A SSO system has other bene ts, including capabilities for credential delegation. In the case of service-oriented framework such as SAVOIR, a SSO system has the added bene t of requiring the end user to input only a single set of credentials, instead of multiple credentials for each service, ameliorating the well-documented problem of password fatigue [2] .
Being in a Web Services environment, typical SSO implementations were not suf cient, in that they usually require some sort of prior arrangement between the client and the server -either some sort of existing trust arrangement, or support for a speci c federation protocol. Beyond simply enabling storage and retrieval for arbitrary credential types, there are other design goals that are required for a service-oriented SSO framework. Foremost among these was extensibility. As new Web Services can be added to an existing system over time, it is important that new services, with new types of credentials, can be added without any change to the system itself. This ensures that client developers do not need to learn the implementation of the storage system, instead concentrating on their primary task, service access. This also reduces system downtime due to upgrades, and lets existing credential de nitions be imported more easily.
Besides extensibility, there are two related features that can provide practical value to the system. One is the ability for a single user to have more than one credential set for a given service, and the other is the ability to assign a single credential to some set of users. For instance, in the example shown in Figure Another potential requirement or feature for a serviceoriented SSO system is its ability to integrate with existing authentication systems, possibly non-Web Services based such as Kerberos [10] or Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [13] . This furthers the goal of SSO by not requiring the user even to submit any credentials to SAVOIR or other systems that provide access to Web Services-enabled composite services.
Finally, access to this system should be exposed as a Web Service, as the other components of the SAVOIR framework are. This requires strong authentication and encryption, to maintain the security of the sensitive authorization data contained in the system. The credential storage and retrieval system naturally needs very strong authentication, and is thus highly dependent on the login system of SAVOIR. Figure 4 shows the relationships between key classes in the credential system, while Figure 5 shows an example execution ow for login and subsequent service access. The basic concept is that users log into the system once, receiving a token that both identi es and authenticates them. When a user wants to access a secured resource, the token is presented to the SAVOIR credential service, which then returns any access credentials that this user is authorized to use for that resource. The service client then passes an appropriate credential set to the corresponding Web Service, and thereafter the user may use that service as they wish. GSI supports WS-Security [11] and WSSecureConversation [15] for message-level privacy and integrity, as well as TLS (formerly SSL) for transport-level security. These security mechanisms provide encryption, authentication, and message integrity, and can be combined for a better functionality to performance balance. Our prototype enables GSI by including some Globus-supplied handlers in an Apache Tomcat Servlet container [18] for serverside support, and on the client with an Apache Axis SOAP engine [19] con gured to use some other Globus handlers.
One feature of GSI is support for RFC 3820 proxy certi cates [25] . These proxy certi cates, an extension to the standard X.509 certi cates of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [24] , allow a short-term certi cate, possibly with constraints on rights, to be signed by a X. Bob is now able to access the modeling service for both his personal models and the Emergency Response VO's common models Furthermore, storing and transmitting credentials in XML grants both server and client-side code language independence.
For the credential storage, MySQL [9] is used as our database engine, though any JDBC-compliant database would work. Each user of our portal corresponds to an entity in the database -these users are mapped to the Distinguished Names on the EEC's they hold in the login system. That mapping associates each user of our portal with their authorization rights when they access the storage system (providing their proxy certi cate, which includes their Distinguished Name).
Users can be aggregated into groups. A group, which is represented by an entity in the database, is simply a way to aggregate users for easier allocation of credentials to a related set of people. For instance, if all students in a university need secured access to a course calendar and school phone directory, they can be added to a Student group, which can then be assigned access rights to these resources.
Groups may also contain other groups, such that all rights of the supergroup are applied to the subgroups, but not viceversa. This allows for ne-grained access-control, while preserving a logical hierarchy of groups. To allow maximum exibility, a given user may belong to any number of groups, and a given group may have any number of supergroups and subgroups, nested to any level.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> <xs:element name="cred"> <xs:complexType> <xs:sequence> <xs:element name="uname" type="xs:string"/> <xs:element name="pword" type="xs:string"/> </xs:sequence> </xs:complexType> </xs:element> </xs:schema> ... <cred> <uname>sue</uname> <pword>g1bb3r15h!</pword> </cred> Finally, the core of the credential lookup system is the authorizes relation, which ties everything together. This relation maps a user or group and a resource to a credential.
The only constraint on this relationship is that each record must be unique. This ensures that any user (or group of users) may have rights to any number of credentials, for any number of resources, and any single credential may be used by any number of users for any number of resources (as in the case where we wish to access multiple external services sharing a login -a portal for instance, or if we wish to give two separate groups access to the same resource using the same password).
This design provides virtually unlimited exiblity in credential storage, while still providing a uni ed method of storage and retrieval. The implementations of user grouping and credential authorization are also fairly loosely coupled, giving us the opportunity to use the user management system in other parts of the SAVOIR system, or even to replace it with a different implementation or model, without changing the code of the other components of the system, including the credential store. 4 Discussion and Related Works
One common objection to SSO systems is that they pro- should mitigate key to the kingdom style issues to a degree that is acceptable for many applications.
While there is signi cant work taking place in multiple contexts to solve the problem of SSO, the key differentiator of our project is that it does not presuppose that the a Web Service user can make any change to the end services.
Changes include adding new authentication protocols, or simply setting up some new trust arrangement. This leads to a separation of responsibility between the service portal and client applications working through it, such that storage of data needed for the provision of credentials is handled by the portal's credential storage system, while actual communication with the end service is enabled by the service client. Although we may add functionality to the portal at a later date to support common authentication protocols, such as Kerberos [10] , that is outside the scope of this sys- with distinct authentication schemes, assuming it is unreasonable to expect to be able to change the end service to suit our authentication, but an unnecessary load on the end user to submit multiple credentials for the same task. We introduced a uni ed authentication framework which stores service credentials in XML-based formats, and associates those credentials with users, roles, or organizations. This is a practical approach to deal with authentications for serviceoriented systems. The key factors distinguishing our framework from other SSO implementations is that it is not limited to a single trust domain or authentication protocol, and that it is capable of storing arbitrary types of credentials, instead of a constrained set.
